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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body 
politic of the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No. 930566 
920905486PD 
INTRODUCTION 
Comes now the Appellant, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 
(hereinafter designated as "Bear River") and through its attorney submits the following 
in reply to the brief filed by the Appellees, Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community 
College, a body politic of the State of Utah. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes in resolving this case are in Utah Code 
Annotated, as follows: 
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§31A-22-302. 
§31A-22-307. 
§31A-22-309. 
§41-12a-103 
§41-12a-301 
§41-12a-407 
§63-30-5. 
§63-30-11. 
§63-30-12. 
§63-30-14. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT MUST NOT BE 
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IN LAW OR 
IN FACT. 
The Defendant, State of Utah's reasoning under Point I is diff icult to 
fol low. It is submitted that it is difficult to differentiate whether Defendant is claiming 
(1) that the State of Utah is not required to arbitrate pursuant to the case of U.S. 
Fidelity & Guarantee v. United States, 728 F.Supp. 6 5 1 , 655 (D.Utah 1989), or (2) 
that they admit that they are required to arbitrate, but that a claim for arbitration has 
not been made by Appellant. 
Suffice to say, in the U.S. Fidelity case, supra, the U.S. Federal District 
Court merely stated that the United States Government was not subject to the 
provisions of the Utah PIP Statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-
22-309(6). The gist of the case was that the State of Utah, by and through its 
Legislature, could not impose, pursuant to the United States Federal Tort Claim Act, 
PIP benefits on the United States. 
Judge Sam stated in that decision clearly his reasoning: 
" . . . The federal waiver, not state law, is the overriding consideration. 
More specifically, under the previously quoted law, the extent of the waiver 
may not be measured solely by the manner in which the state legislature 
addresses the federal government in its no-fault insurance plan." 
The Court held that the requirement of the state of Utah for arbitration 
would expand the scope of the United States Federal Tort Claim Act to require the 
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Federal Government to arbitrate without congressional authorization. The Federal 
waiver, not state law, is the overriding consideration. 
Therefore, the application of the U.S. Fidelity case has no application in 
this case for the simple reason that it's a case of federal immunity and sovereignty vs. 
state immunity and sovereignty as Judge Sam stated that the Utah State sovereignty 
must be subject to the United States Federal Government's sovereignty under the 
Federal Tort Claim Act. 
As to the question of arbitration by the state of Utah, this is statutory, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309(6) and we allege 
that this issue or question of arbitration has become a proper issue before the Court. 
A review of the facts and pleadings in the above matter will amply demonstrate that 
the question of arbitration was properly brought before the Court and the position of 
the Defendant that it can have the Complaint dismissed for not raising the issue of 
arbitration is not apropos to the status of this case at this time. 
A review of the facts amply demonstrates the Appellant's position as 
follows: 
1. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint largely in the nature of a declaratory 
action stating two causes of action: 
a. that the Defendant was negligent; and 
b. that the Utah Government Immunity Act Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11 did not apply because the obligation 
of PIP benefits was contractual in nature. (R.2) 
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2. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated February 1 , 1993, 
(R.19), (see the Addendum) and a Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, (R.21), (see the Addendum) which set forth the ground for dismissal based 
upon Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11 and 63-30-12, failure to 
state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The Memorandum, does not 
mention arbitration, but merely that (1) there was failure to file a timely notice and (2) 
that the obligation as to Bear River Mutual was not contractual and the obligations 
between the parties were not contractual in nature, as set forth in §31 A-22-309(5). 
A cursory reading will demonstrate that the Defendant did not raise the question of 
arbitration in its Motion to Dismiss. 
3. Then fol lowing a hearing on April 8 ,1993, the Court entered a 
Minute Entry, dated June 15, 1993, (R.85) (see the Addendum) which provided two 
basis for the Motion to Dismiss: 
" 1 . Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action is 
granted. Plaintiff failed to comply wi th the strict notice requirements of the 
Utah governmental immunity act. 
2. Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs second cause of action fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 31 A-22-309(5) . " 
4 . Thereafter, on July 6, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a Motion (R.86) (see 
the Addendum) to vacate the Minute Entry of June 15, 1993, to conform to the 
decision in Sue Neel v. State of Utah, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993), in that the 
Court of Appeals had rendered the Minute Entry moot and the said Minute Entry and 
decision of the Minute Entry was therefore inconsistent wi th the Neel case. 
Page 4 
5. Defendants, on July 13, 1993, filed their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaint i f fs Motion to Vacate the Minute Entry, (R.106) (see the 
Addendum) attempting to distinguish the Neel case, supra, raised for the first t ime, 
in that Memorandum, on page 5, the question of arbitration. This was the first time 
it was raised not by motion but by memorandum and was not contained in the Minute 
Entry or the previous motion of Defendants to Dismiss. 
6. The Minute Entry dated September 15, 1993, on Plainti f fs Motion 
to Vacate the Minute Entry of June 15, 1993, pursuant to the Neel case, supra, and 
a copy of the Minute Entry, (R.130) (see Addendum) stated: 
" 1) The June 16, 1993 Minute Entry encompassed the issues raised in 
the foregoing motions. 
2) The court reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to preparation of 
June 16, 1993 Minute Entry and found Neel to be distinguishable from the 
present case. 
3) The court submits Second Request to the state of Utah to prepare 
an order consistent wi th this minute entry and the June 16, 1993 minute 
entry." 
7. The Order of Dismissal (R.133)(see the Addendum) provided for 
two grounds: (1) failure to comply with the strict notice requirements of the Utah 
Government Immunity Act , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11(12), 
and (2) dismissing the ground pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
§31 A-22-309(5) on the grounds that the claims were not contractual in nature. 
8. Therefore, the three issues set forth in Appellant's Brief, as 
fol lows, are still properly before the Court: 
POINT I: 
Bear River Mutual is not required to comply with the procedural 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-
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12 as to notice on personal injury protection claims as provided for 
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-307 through 
309 as to the State of Utah. 
POINT II: 
The State of Utah is required, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended §31 A22-309(6) to arbitrate with Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Co. on PIP claims. 
POINT III: 
That the Trial Court committed error in refusing Plaintiff's request to 
require the State to arbitrate. 
9. The question of arbitration was brought to the Court's attention 
in the Request for Hearing, and the attached Memorandum (R.128)(see the 
Addendum) in which Plaintiff requested the Court to vacate its previous minute entry 
and refer the matter to arbitration if the Defendants were now claiming arbitration was 
an issue. 
10. The question of arbitration was raised by the Appellee in its 
memoranda and the Appellant raised the question of being submitted to arbitration 
also by memoranda.(R.106) 
11. Arbitration has been properly brought before this Court through the 
pleadings and memoranda filed. There is no basis for dismissing the matter for failure 
to claim arbitration because the Appellees claimed arbitration in their memoranda and 
Appellant claimed that the Court should refer it to arbitration if it overruled the Neel 
case, supra. 
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POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFFS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT 
FAIL ON THE BASIS THAT THERE IS NO CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF INSURER AND DEFENDANT 
EMPLOYER. 
The issue requirement under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
§60-30-12 providing for notice under the Government Immunity Act as it applies to 
personal injury protection, is fully set forth in Point I of the Appellant's original brief. 
The statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-5(1) provides as 
fol lows: 
"(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as 
to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights 
or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-
1 1 , 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19." (emphasis 
added) 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended §41-12a-301 provides that the state of Utah shall 
maintain owner 's or operator's security in effect continuously in respect to their 
vehicles. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §41-12a-103(9) provides that 
the owner 's security may be furnished in a number of ways: 
"(9) 'Owner 's or operator's security,' 'owner 's secur i ty / or 
'operator's security' means any of the fol lowing: 
(a) an insurance policy or combination of policies conforming to 
Section 31A-22-302, which is issued by an insurer authorized to do 
business in Utah; 
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer authorized to do a surety 
business in Utah in which the surety is subject to the minimum coverage 
limits and other requirements of policies conforming to Section 
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31A-22-302, which names the department as a creditor under the 
bond for the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the bond; 
(c) a deposit wi th the state treasurer of cash or securities 
complying wi th Section 41-12a-406; 
(d) maintaining a certificate of self-funded coverage under Section 
41-12a-407; 
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31 A-22-302 issued by the Risk 
Management Fund created in Section 63A-4 -201 . " 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-302 provides that 
"Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner 's 
or operator's security requirement . . . " shall provide for personal injury protection 
benefits. 
The importance in the statutory scheme though, is Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended §41-12a-407(2) which provides: 
"(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under 
this chapter shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded 
person's operation, maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an 
insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person containing the 
coverages under Section 31 A-22-302." (emphasis added) 
The importance of the statutory particular provision is that the persons 
that are self-insured, must pay benefits under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31A-22-309, the same as if there were two independent, statutory 
insurers. 
CONCLUSION 
The questions raised in point II and Point III of Appellants brief are exactly 
the same issues raised in the Neel case, supra. The State argued that there was no 
contract between its insured and itself to pay PIP benefits. The Neel case, supra, 
stated it was statutorily contractual. The final bottom line argument is that if the 
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State of Utah's obligation to pay PIP claims to operators of its automobile and Bear 
River Mutual's obligation is contractual to pay PIP claims to its insureds, then why go 
through the hoops of sending a notice before requiring both parties to arbitrate. If the 
State of Utah can require Bear River Mutual to arbitrate without giving prior notice, 
isn't it apropos that Bear River can require the State of Utah arbitrate with giving prior 
notice? The purpose of the Utah PIP statute is to provide for a summary and speedy 
remedy for the payment of claims and the settlement of claims between the various 
insurers. 
This is in direct opposition to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
§41-12a-407(2) which provides that self-insurers shall pay benefits and shall be 
subjected to the same statutory provisions as private insurance carriers. If private 
insurance carriers are not required to send notice to each other, why should the state 
of Utah, which is under the same duty, demand that the hoops of notice be complied 
with before they can be required to arbitrate? 
If it appeals to the State of Utah's sense of justice that the "hoops" of 
notice is the intent of Legislature, or should be proper procedure, by all means let 
them adopt it; but it doesn't appeal to this Appellant and all similar insurance carriers 
in the state of Utah who are trying to carry out the mandate of the Legislature. 
Dated this J>d> day of < * ? W t ^ y v l 9 9 4 . 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
se™>*^ A J&>* 
"h6mas7V. Duff in 
Attorney for Appellant 
Page 9 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief to 
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Elizabeth King 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this / day of {2&14JJA 994 
Page 10 
ADDENDUM 
Index to Addendum 
DATE OF 
DOCUMENT 
9/26/92 
2/1/93 
2/1/93 
6/15/93 
6/30/93 
7/13/93 
7/26/93 
9/15/93 
10/3/93 
DOCUMENT 
Complaint 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated 
February 1, 1993 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Court Minute Entry 
July 6, 1993, Plaintiff's Motion to 
vacate the Minute Entry of June 15, 
1993, to conform to the decision in 
Sue Neel v. State of Utah, 854 P.2d 
581 (Utah App. 1993), 
Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Vacate the Minute Entry of 6/15/93 
Plaintiff's Request for Hearing 
Minute Entry 
Order of Dismissal 
RECORD 
PAGE NO. 
2 
19 
21 
85 
86 
106 
128 
130 
132 
ADDENDUM 
PAGE NO. 
13 
18 
20 
24 
25 
27 
33 
49 
50 
Page 12 
'^-.^.e-uoyiV 
3 
I? 
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JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-6600 
0.QT, I & ^ » J & 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body 
politic of the State of Utah 
C O M P L A I N T 
Defendants \\ > n ^ \ £ H 
civil NO. q*&?oS"SrGP^ 
Comes now the Plaintiff by and through his attorney, 
Thomas A. Duffin, and complains of the Defendants, Mike Jacobsen 
and Utah Valley Community College, a body politic of the state of 
Utah, and respectfully represents unto the court as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. Defendant, Utah Valley Community College, is a 
subdivision or agency of the State of Utah, created by the 
Legislature of the State of Utah under the provisions of the Utah 
State Constitution, Article XI, Section 1. 
2. This suit is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annota-
ted, 1953, Title 63, Chapter 30, Sections 1 through 38. 
00002 
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3. Jurisdiction is also conferred upon the above 
entitled court pursuant to the provisions of the Utah State 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7, (Due Process) No person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law. 
4* That on March 28, 1991, the plaintiff, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-11.and 12, petitioned Salt Lake 
County for relief. Said petition was denied by refusal to answer 
within 90 days as required by statute. 
5. The plaintiff hereby files an undertaking required 
by Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §63-30-19. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. That at all times herein the plaintiff was an 
insurance company duly organized and existing under the laws of 
the state of Utah and authorized to engage in the insurance 
business who issued a policy of insurance to Larry J. Remm, 
providing for personal injury protection coverage, policy No. 
C127191. 
7. That at all times herein the Defendant, Utah 
Valley Community College, was a body politic of the State of 
Utah, oi an agency of the State of Utah. 
8. That at all times herein, Mike Jacobsen, was a 
resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and was an agent of Utah 
Valley Community College and the state of Utah and was driving a 
00003 
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vehicle during the performance of his duties within the scope of 
his employment and under color of authority of Utah Valley 
Community College and the state of Utah. 
9. That at all times herein, on January 4, 1991, 
Larry J. Remm, was the owner of a 1978 Chevrolet automobile, 
which was being driven by himself and insured with Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Co. with personal injury protection benefits. 
10. The event out of which this cause of action arose 
took place and occurred on February 15, 1991, at approximately 
1:00 p.m. at 4500 South and 320 West, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
when Defendant's Agent negligently ran his vehicle into the 
vehicle owned and driven by Larry J. Remm, causing personal 
injuries in the sum of $2,257.00. 
11. That at the time and place mentioned herein the 
Defendant, by and through its agent, employee, Mike Jacobsen, in 
the course of his employment and in the performance of his 
duties, when Larry J. Remm was operating his automobile in a 
northbound direction exiting 115 and turned west onto 4500 South 
when Mike Jacobsen struck the right rear of the Remm automobile. 
12. The said defendant, Utah Valley Community College, 
a body politic of the State of Utah, by and through its agent, 
Mike Jacobsen, was grossly negligent, reckless, careless and 
guilty of unlawful conduct in the operation of its vehicle in the 
following particulars: 
00004 
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a. failing to maintain a proper lookout; 
b. failing to keep his vehicle under proper control; 
c. traveling too fast for existing conditions. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for cause of action against 
the Defendants alleges: 
13. Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorpo-
rates herein paragraphs 1 through 12 inclusive of the First Cause 
of Action as though the allegations contained therein were fully 
and comletely set forth herein. 
14. That Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
§63-30-10.5, provides: 
M(l) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental entity has 
taken or damaged private property without just 
compensation." 
15. That the Utah Personal Injury Protection Coverage 
and Benefits statute and reimbursement as more fully set forth in 
UCA 31A-22-309(5) provides that the payment for Personal Injury 
Protection benefits are contractual in nature. That no notice is 
required for contractual obligations. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. For judgment against Defendants in the sum of 
$2,257.00, interest and court costs. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
2. For judgment against Defendants in the sum of 
$2,257.00, interest and court costs. 
Dated this £-£> day of September, 1992. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
<<*+>,fr0k>«'j& 
Plaintiff's Address: 
9158 South Cripple Creek Circle 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Pc6 
0000$ 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
a body politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
Defendants Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College, by 
and through counsel, move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint for failure to comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 12 of 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and for failure to state a cause 
of action upon which relief can be granted. This Motion is 
supported by the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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DATED this I day of February, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, this / b day 
of February, 1993, to the following: 
Thomas A. Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
sVtiy4W/ ^ W q ^ 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
a body politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
Defendants Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College, by 
and through counsel, submit this Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleges that 
it is entitled to recover for personal injury damages incurred by 
its insured, Larry J. Remm, resulting from a collision between 
Remm's vehicle and Defendant's vehicle on or about February 15, 
1991. 
0C021 
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Plaintiff alleges that it served a notice of claim on Salt 
Lake County on March 28, 1991. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE 
A TIMELY NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act requires that an individual 
must file a notice of claim prior to bringing suit against the 
State, any of its agencies, or a political subdivision. See U.C.A. 
§§ 63-30-12 and 13 (1953, as amended) . The claim is "barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11 
. . . ." (U.C.A. § 63-30-12). 
The notice of claim requirements set forth in Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act are mandatory and "strict compliance" is 
the statutory standard. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to 
maintain a suit." Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1975). 
In the present case, Plaintiff's cause of action arose on 
February 15, 1991, the date of Remm's accident. Plaintiff alleges 
that it filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County on March 28, 
1991. This notice of claim is of no effect since Salt Lake County 
2 
00022 
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has no governing relationship to Utah Valley Community College 
whatsoever. 
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred for failure to serve a 
timely notice of claim and its Complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE 
OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 
Plaintiff's second cause of action is an apparent attempt to 
avoid the notice of claim requirement by alleging that its cause of 
action arises under § 31A-22-309(5) of the Utah Insurance Code. 
Plaintiff then claims that this creates a contractual obligation 
for which no notice of claim is required under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff's theory is fundamentally flawed. First, there is 
no contract between Plaintiff and Defendants, and there is no basis 
to imply a contract from the language of the Insurance Code. 
Second, Utah Valley Community College is not an "insurer" and is 
not governed by the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. See 
U.C.A. § 31A-12-107. 
Plaintiff's attempt to avoid the notice of claim requirements 
of the Governmental Immunity Act by alleging that its second cause 
of action sounds in contract pursuant to U.C.A. § 31A-22-309 (5) is 
without merit since Defendants are not governed by the Insurance 
3 
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Code. Therefore, Plaintiff's second cause of action should be 
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
WHEREFORE, for the reasons explained above, Defendants pray 
that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that it 
take nothing thereby. 
DATED this I day of February, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS, postage prepaid, this / ^  day of February, 1993, to the 
following: 
Thomas A. Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
JACOBSEN, MIKE 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920905486 PD 
DATE 06/15/93 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT 
FOR DECISION AFTER ORAL ARGUMENT. THE COURT HAVING TAKEN THE 
MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT COMES NOW BEING FULLY INFORMED AND RULES 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE STRICT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
2. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF 
MAY BE GRANTED UNDER 31A-22-3Q9 (5). 
3. DEFENDANTS TO PREPARE ORDER. 
CC: BARBARA E. OCHOA 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
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ZZ'jp,t 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of ">•'. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON^? _ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff C&pecJ** 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY 
OF JUNE 16, 1993, MOTION TO 
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT, 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL 
ARGUMENT TO CONFORM THE MINUTE 
ENTRY OF JUNE 16, 1993 PURSUANT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION IN NEEL V. STATE OF UTAH 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comes now the Plaintiff and moves the above-entitled Court to vacate 
the Minute Entry dated June 15,1993, in which the above-entitled Court found as 
follows: 
" 1. Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action 
is granted. Plaintiff failed to comply with the strict notice requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff second cause of 
action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 31A-
22-309(5)." 
Prior to entry of the above Minute Entry and before it came to the 
attention of the Court, the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Neel v. State of Utah. 
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213 Utah Adv.Rep. 43, and reversed the position of the State of Utah. The legal 
argument of Plaintiff pursuant to the previous memorandum has been affirmed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, therefore, the Minute Entry of June 15, 1993, should be 
appropriately amended to reflect the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this, %D day of June, 1993. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
?%&&s& 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to the following 
parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
Litigation Division 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this^JT^day of June, 1993. 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
a body politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants by and through counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa, Assistant 
Attorney General submit this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleges that 
it is entitled to recover for personal injury damages incurred by 
its insured, Larry J. Remm, resulting from a collision between 
Remm's vehicle and Defendant's vehicle on or about February 15, 
1991. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleged negligence and its 
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second cause of action sounded in contract pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard by this Court and a 
Minute Entry was issued on June 15, 1993 ruling that Plaintiff's 
first cause of action should be dismissed for failure to comply 
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and that Plaintiff's second cause of action should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). 
Plaintiff has now filed a "Motion to Vacate Minute Entry of 
June 16, 1993, Motion to File an Amended Complaint, Motion for 
Additional Oral Argument to Conform the Minute Entry of June 16, 
1993 Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals Decision in Neel v. 
State of Utah'1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
Plaintiff's first cause of action, based on negligence, was 
properly dismissed for failure to comply with the strict notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff fails to cite any new or different authority for its 
proposition that the letter it sent to the State Office of Risk 
Management constituted an adequate notice of claim. This argument 
has been ruled on and Plaintiff should not be allowed to reargue 
2 
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this issue by means of a Motion to Vacate. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
Plaintiff is not entitled to protection under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-308 and its complaint was therefore properly dismissed. 
Defendants admit, for purposes of this argument only, that 
they are required to maintain owner's or operator's security 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301 (3) , and that they are 
further obligated to provide personal injury protection coverage 
(PIP) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2). 
Personal injury protection is defined in Section 31A-22-306 as 
follows: 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 
31A-22-302 (2) provides the coverages and 
benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to 
persons described under Section 31A-22-308, 
but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, 
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-
309. 
(emphasis added). The next logical inquiry is whether Plaintiff or 
its insured is one of the persons intended to be protected under 
Section 31A-22-308. 
Section 31A-22-308 identifies those persons who lfmay receive 
benefits under personal injury protection coverage": (1) the named 
insured; (2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, 
adoption, or guardianship; and (3) "any other natural person whose 
injuries arise out of an automobile accident occurring while the 
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person occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy . . . ". 
Plaintiff's insured, Larry Remm, meets the criteria to collect from 
his own insurance carrier, but not against the PIP coverage carried 
by the State. Mr. Remm was not the named insured on the State's 
policy, nor is he related by blood or marriage to the State, and he 
did not occupy the state vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Clearly, neither Mr. Remm nor his insurance carrier qualifies as a 
person entitled to benefits under Section 31A-22-308. 
As a result, Plaintiff's contract claim must fail since only 
!l[t]he person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in 
contract to recover the expenses plus interest" if the insurer 
fails to pay the expenses when due under PIP coverage. Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). 
The case of Neel v. State of Utah. 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah 
Ct. App. 5/21/93) is distinguishable from the present case because 
Neel was a passenger in the state vehicle at the time of the 
accident and therefore qualified as a person entitled to PIP 
benefits under § 31A-22-308. As such, she was entitled to sue the 
State, as a self-insurer, in contract, to recover PIP benefits. 
Unlike Neel, this Plaintiff does not qualify for PIP protection and 
therefore may not maintain a contract cause of action against the 
State or against these Defendants. 
Plaintiff may claim that it is entitled to proceed under 
4 
00109 
Page 30 
§ 31A-22-309(6) which requires insurers to determine their 
respective liabilities through mandatory, binding arbitration. 
This section is not applicable in the present case since neither 
the Defendants nor the State are considered "insurers" under the 
code. See U.C.A. § 31A-12-107. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled in 
McCaffery on behalf of McCafferv v. Grow. 787 P.2d 901# 905 (Utah 
App. 1990) that Section 31A-22-309(6) does not contemplate 
arbitration between a self-insured and an insurance company. The 
Court also concluded that even if self-insureds were included in 
§ 31A-22-309 (6) that the courts would not be the correct forum to 
pursue a claim since the statute specifies arbitration as the 
proper recourse. Id. at 905, n. 4. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, Defendants request that 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry be denied. 
DATED this day of July, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
. OCHOA 3ARBARA E.
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, this /5> ^  day 
of July, 1993, to the following: 
Thomas A. Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
.„3TP"\^ 00URT 
R!CT 
JUL 
THIS. 
BY -J&^pfffilSltM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comes now the Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b), Utah Court Rules, 
Code of Judicial Administration, and requests a hearing on its Motion to File Second 
Amended Complaint and Motion to Vacate Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and 
subsequent Request for Summary Judgment Ruling Referring the Matter to Arbitration. 
Dated th i££2_ day of July, 1993. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
/^^ PndYhas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiff ~PP 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Request for Hearing to the 
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
Litigation Division 
330 South 300 East 
SajrLake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, t h i s ^ p d a y of July, 1993 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY AND 
REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RULING REFERRING THE MATTER TO 
SUBROGATION 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comes now the Plaintiff and submits its Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry and Request 
for Summary Judgment Ruling Referring the Matter to Subrogation. 
Background 
Since the Court made its initial minute entry in the above-entitled matter, 
and the Defendant has filed its reply memorandum, the Court of Appeals in the case 
of Neel v. State of Utah, 213 Utah Adv.Rep. 43, handed down a decision in reference 
to personal injury benefits as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31A-22-302. Therefore, the complete setting of the case has been 
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changed and therefore, the above-entitled matter should be referred, if the State so 
desires, for arbitration, as more fully set forth in McCafferv on behalf of McCafferv v. 
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE MOTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF 
NEGLIGENCE, 
In the Neel case, supra, it states that all PIP benefits are based on 
contract. That matters based upon contract are not subject to the notice requirements 
of the Government Immunity Act. The Defendant complete ignores the decision and 
fails to realize that this action is not brought for and on behalf of Bear River Mutual's 
insured, but Bear River Mutual's right under PIP benefits, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended §31A-22-309. 
Point II. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT SHOULD APPOINT AN ARBITRATOR FOR 
A DECISION IN THE MATTER. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended § provides that self-insurers 
are on on the same basis as insurance companies. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31A-22-309 states: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be 
held legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person 
to whom benefits required under personal injury protection have 
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who would 
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be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and 
its amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers." 
The Neel case, supra, is dispositive of the very issue in this case in which 
the Court stated as follows: 
"Section 41-12a-401 (1)(d) specifically requires that in order for the State 
to self-fund its motor vehicle insurance obligations, it must have a 
certificate of self-funded coverage. Section 41-12a-407(2) governs self-
funding certificates and provides that anyone who holds 
a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter shall pay 
benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's 
operation, maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an 
insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person containing the 
coverages under Section 31A-22-302. 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-12a-407(2) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). 
See also section 41 -12a-306(3) (owners maintaining owner's security by 
means other than an insurance policy must comply with sections 31A-
26-301 through -311, which govern the claim practice of 'insurers'). 
While the State is not a statutory 'insurer' for the general purposes of 
title 31 A, section 41-12a-407(2) expressly requires the State to assume 
certain obligations of an 'insurer' if the State elects to self-insure. By 
electing to self-insure, the State has elected to provide PIP benefits in the 
same manner an an independent insurer. If the State, as a self-insured 
owner, must pay PIP benefits just as if it were an independent insurer of 
those benefits, then there is no rational distinction between a lawsuit 
brought against the State for failure to pay PIP benefits and a similar 
lawsuit brought against an independent insurer. In both cases, the 
injured party is suing the 'insurer' of the vehicle based upon a statutorily 
created contractual claim. 
We therefore hold that a suit to recover PIP benefits brought directly 
agianst the State as the self-insurer of its motor vehicles is contractual 
in nature. The State's election to self-insure cannot become a stumbling 
block to the swift recovery of PIP benefits. Neel's benefit claim should 
therefore be resolved in the same speedy manner it would have been had 
the State purchased an independent insurance policy." 
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The defendant is this case is objecting pursuant to the case of McCafferv 
on behalf of McCafferv v. Grow, supra, which states that arbitration is the correct 
forum for reimbursement pursuant to PIP benefits. This may be so; but the State in 
this case should demand arbitration or file an appropriate objection by motion. The 
above-entitled Court, pursuant to a proper motion should then appoint an arbitrator to 
hear the matter and properly dispose of it. 
Therefore, putting all semantics aside, we will agree, pursuant to the 
McCafferv case, supra, and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-
309(1), that the Court should appoint an arbitrator with the authority to arbitrate the 
PIP benefits between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Dated t h i s ^ ? day of July, 1993. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
i/fHbrnas A. Duffin ///7 
Attorney for Plaintiff //// 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Response to the following 
parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
Litigation Division 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this ft / day of July, 1993. 
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t evidence in the record and for farther 
findings and conclusions in support of the 
alimony award. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. In essence, Mr. Godfrey is claiming that he 
received an advancement from his father in 
anticipation of the share he would inherit from "his 
father's estate. See Utah Code Ann. §75-2-110 (1993). 
Even if Mr. Godfrey had provided sufficient evidence 
that he had received an advancement on his 
inheritance from his father, he cannot also claim the 
advancement constituted a loan because the terms have 
mutually inconsistent definitions. See Ned J, Bowman 
Co. v. White, 369 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah 1962). 
2. An exchange between Mrs. Godfrey's attorney and 
the court supports this conclusion: 
Mr. Hadfieid: Does the court find that there 
has been proven a debt to the estate on the 
Harper property? There were no documents that 
were produced on that. 
The Court: I believe there would be a debt on 
it, yes. All debts that are in the form of 
mortgages and that type of thing will have to be 
assumed on the property she takes. 
3. Mrs. Godfrey also contests Mr. Godfrey's assertion 
of a $14,000 debt against another piece of property 
awarded to her, allegedly owed to the family nursing 
home corporation. Mrs. Godfrey points out that this 
alleged obligation was unsupported by the evidence. 
Moreover, the trial court did not make a finding 
regarding this obligation. We agree that there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to support the 
existence of this claimed obligation. 
4. Mr. Godfrey also argued the stock transfer was 
restricted and the stock could only be sold to his 
brother and sisters at par value, and thus, his two 
hundred shares had a value of only $200. However, 
the trial court doubted the enforceability of this 
requirement and gave little weight to it in valuing the 
stock. 
5. We decline to use the record and to apply the three 
factors as a matter of law on appeal. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Sue NEEL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 920547-CA 
FILED: May 21, 1993 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor 
ATTORNEYS: 
Daniel L. Wilson, Ogden, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Brent A. Burnett, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Onne, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant, Sue Neel, appeals the trial court's 
dismissal of her claim against the State of Utah 
for insurance benefits. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
In December of 1990, Neel was a passenger in 
a State-owned vehicle when she was injured in 
an accident. Utah law requires the State to 
maintain security providing certain benefits to 
persons injured in automobile accidents 
involving state-owned vehicles. Neel filed a 
claim for benefits with the State Department of 
Risk Management. She filed directly with the 
State because the State was self-insured. When 
no benefits were timely paid, Neel filed suit in 
district court, seeking payment from the State as 
the "insurer- of the vehicle. 
The State moved to dismiss Neel's complaint. 
It argued that since she was suing the State^ she 
must comply with the procedural requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-1 through -38 (1989). 
Specifically, the State argued that Neel failed to 
comply with section 63-30-12 which provides 
that a party with a claim against the State must 
file a notice of claim with the attorney general 
and the agency involved before filing a lawsuit. 
Additionally, the State claimed that she failed to 
comply with section 63-30-19 which requires 
that any lawsuit filed against the State be 
accompanied by an undertaking to cover taxable 
costs in the event the State prevails. 
Neel responded that she was not required,to 
comply with the notice and undertaking 
tnts because she was bringing an action 
in contract, ajaa contract suits are expressly 
exempted from the procedural requirements by 
section 63-30-5(1). .he trial court nevertheless 
granted the State's motion and dismissed Neel's 
complaint without prejudice. 
Neel asserts on appeal that the trial court 
misconstrued her contract claim to be a tort 
claim. She contends that since the State is 
self-insured, she must bring her contract claim 
for benefits against the State directly, just as if 
she were bringing it against a separate insurer of 
the State. Consequently, she argues that the 
notice of claim and the undertaking requirement 
do not apply to her lawsuit. We agree. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When we review a trial court's decision to 
dismiss a cause of action, we assume that the 
factual allegations made by the plaintiff are true. 
We then review the trial court's ruling to see 
whether the prevailing party was nevertheless 
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. We 
therefore apply a correction-of-error standard of 
review to the trial court's ruling. Anderson v. 
Dean, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992). 
ANALYSIS 
Neel's assertion that her claim against the 
State may be heard without complying with the 
procedural requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act stems from the State's statutory 
obligation to insure its motor vehicles. 
The state of Utah and all its political 
subdivisions and their respective 
departments, institutions, or agencies shall 
maintain owner's or operator's security in 
effect continuously with respect to their 
motor vehicles. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-301(3) (1988). 
In order to maintain "owner's or operator's 
security,M the State must exercise one of the 
following methods of securing benefits for a 
party injured in an automobile accident involving 
a State vehicle: (1) an insurance policy; (2) a 
surety bond; (3) a deposit with the state 
treasurer; (4) a certificate of self-ftmded 
coverage; or (5) a policy issued by the Risk 
Management Fund. Section 41-12a-103(9).1 
Each of these methods must provide the 
following "personal injury protection" coverages 
and benefits ("PEP benefits"): (1) reasonable 
medical expenses; (2) lost income resulting from 
an inability to work; (3) work the injured person 
would have performed for his or her family; (4) 
funeral benefits; and (5) wrongful death benefits. 
See section 31A-22-307. These PIP benefits 
must be provided for any "natural person whose 
injuries arise out of an automobile'accident 
occurring while the person occupies a [covered] 
motor vehicle . . . ." Section 31A-22-308(3). 
Finally, section 31A-22-309(5) provides that a 
claimant entitled to PIP benefits may sue the 
insurer of a vehicle if the insurer fails to pay the 
PIP benefits within thirty days. 
Neel brought her action against the State in 
accordance with the foregoing statutes. The State 
moved to dismiss Neel's cause of action for her 
failure to comply with the vernmental 
Immunity Act. Neel admits that she has not 
provided the notice of claim and the undertaking 
required by the Act. She claims, however, that 
she is exempted from these requirements 
because her claim against the State is contractual 
in nature. Section 63-30-5(1) of the Act provides 
that: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation. Actions arising out of contractual 
rights or-obligations shall not be subject to 
the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 
63-30-12, 63-30-13,63-30-14,63-30-15, or 
63-30-19. 
(Emphases added.) 
In response, the State faults Neel for not 
identifying a contract between her and the State 
that has been breached. It is unnecessary, 
however, for Neel to identify a direct contract 
between the parties since Neel is an intended 
third-party beneficiary. Neel correctly asserts 
that section 31A-22-309(5) expressly states that 
an action brought to recover PIP benefits from 
the insurer of a vehicle is contractual. Section 
31A-22-309(5) provides: "If the insurer fails to 
pay the expenses when due, . . . [t]he person 
entitled to the benefits may bring an action in 
contract to recover the expenses . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) The narrow issue involved in 
this case is whether the State's assumption of the 
role of self-insurer has altered the contractual 
nature of an action brought against the State, as 
the insurer, to recover PIP benefits. 
The State claims that the reference to 
"insurer" in section 31A-22-309(5) cannot 
include the State and points to the statutory 
definition of "insurer" found in section 
31A-l-301(48)(a), which provides: 
"Insurer" means any person doing an 
insurance business as a principal, . . . and 
any person purporting or intending to do an 
insurance business as a principal on his own 
account. 7/ does not include a governmental 
entity, as defined in Subsection 63-30-2(3), 
to the extent it is engaged in the activities 
described in Section 31A-12-107. 
(Emphasis added.) The State further cites to 
section 31A-12-107, which provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
title, a governmental entity, as defined in 
Subsection 63-30-2(3), is not an insurer for 
purposes of this title and is not engaged in 
the business of insurance to the extent it is 
covering its own liabilities under Title 63, 
Chapter 30, the Governmental Immunity 
Act, or engaging in other related risk 
management activities related to the normal 
course of its activities. 
(Emphasis added.) Finally, the State argues that 
the provisions of title 31A do not pertain to 
self-insurers. Section 31A-1-103(3), states: 
"Except as otherwise expressly provided, this 
title does not apply to: . . . (f) self-insurance; . 
n 
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These provisions indeed declare that the State 
is not a statutory "insurer" as that term is 
generally used in title 31A. However, this 
exclusion of the State from the general 
provisions of title 31A is superseded by specific 
statutory language which expressly requires that 
the State comply with certain portions of title 
31 A. See Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984) ("When 
two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the 
more specific provision will govern over the 
general provision."). Likewise, the exclusion of 
self-insurance from the effects of title 31A is 
overcome by other specific statutes expressly 
providing that sections 31A-22-302 through -309 
apply to self-insurers. 
Section 41-12a-401(l)(d) specifically requires 
that in order for the State to self-fund its motor 
vehicle insurance obligations, it must have a 
certificate of self-funded coverage. Section 
41-12a-407(2) governs self-funding certificates 
and provides that anyone who holds 
a certificate of self-funded coverage under 
this chapter shall pay benefits to persons 
injured from the self-fimded person's 
operation, maintenance, and use of motor 
vehicles as would an insurer issuing a 
policy to the self-funded person containing 
the coverages under Section 31 A-22-302. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-407(2) (Supp. 1992) 
(emphasis added). See also section 
41-12a-306(3) (owners maintaining owner's 
security by means other than an insurance policy 
must comply with sections 31A-26-301 through 
-311, which govern the claim practice of 
"insurers"). 
While the State is not a statutory "insurer" for 
the general purposes of title 31 A, section 
41-12a-407(2) expressly requires the State to 
assume certain obligations of an "insurer" if the 
State elects to self-insure. By electing to 
self-insure, the State has elected to provide PEP 
benefits in the same manner as an independent 
insurer. If the State, as a self-insured owner, 
must pay PIP benefits just as if it were an 
independent insurer of those benefits, then there 
is no rational distinction between a lawsuit 
brought against the State for failure to pay PIP 
benefits and a similar lawsuit brought against an 
independent insurer. In both cases, the injured 
party is suing the "insurer" of the vehicle based 
upon a statutorily created contractual claim. 
We therefore hold that a suit to recover PIP 
benefits brought directly against the State as the 
self-insurer of its motor vehicles is contractual 
in nature.2 The State's election to self-insure 
cannot become a stumbling block to the swift 
recovery of PIP benefits. Neel's benefit claim 
should therefore be resolved in the same speedy 
manner it would have been had the State 
purchased an independent insurance policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Neel is suing the "insurer" of the Stateys 
vehicle as is her "contractual" right P a g e 4 2 
opted to self-insure for the PIP benefits required 
in section 31 A-22-302, it assumed the statutory 
role of "insurer" for purposes of section 
31A-22-309(5). A lawsuit brought by an injured 
party against the State as the "insurer" of its 
vehicles therefore remains contractual in nature. 
Since Neel's cause of action was contractual in 
nature, she was exempt from the notice of claim 
and undertaking requirements found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court 
therefore erred in dismissing her complaint. 
The dismissal of Neel's complaint is reversed 
and this matter is remanded to the trial court for 
farther proceedings.3 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Regardless of the form of security selected, the 
owner must provide the intended beneficiaries the full 
benefits required by statute. 
"Owner's or operator's security," "owner's 
security/ or "operator's security" mean any of 
the following: 
(a) an insurance policy or combination of 
policies conforming to Section 31 A-22-302 which 
is issued by an insurer authorized to do business 
in Utah; 
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer 
authorized to do a surety business in Utah in 
which the surety is subject to the minimum 
coverage limits and other requirements of policies 
conforming to Section 31 A-22-302, which names 
the department as a creditor under the bond for 
the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the 
bond; 
(c) a deposit with the state treasurer of cash or 
securities complying with Section 41-12a-4Q6\ 
(d) maintaining a certificate of self-funded 
coverage under Section 41-12a-407\ 
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31 A-22-302 
issued by the Risk Management Fund created in 
Section 63-1-47. 
Section41-12a-103(9)(Supp. 1992) (emphases added); 
see also sections 4 l-12a-406(2)and -407(1) (expressly 
referring to section 31 A-22-302); and section 31A-22-* 
302 (requiring benefits found in section 31A-22-307). 
2. Otherwise, individuals injured in State vehicles 
could be treated differendy depending upon whether 
the State opted to self-insure or to purchase an 
independent insurance policy. If the State were to 
purchase an independent insurance policy, a claimant 
could simply file for PEP benefits without impediment. 
If benefits were not timely paid, the claimant could 
file a third-party beneficiary contract suit direcdy 
against the insurer, without the cost of an undertaking. 
The claimant could also file multiple benefit claims on 
a monthly basis as soon as expenses accrued and the 
insurer would be required to pay those benefits within 
thirty days or face an immediate lawsuit. 
If, on the other hand, a claimant were required to 
satisfy the Governmental Immunity Act before 
claiming PIP benefits, the claimant would "Wf\ 
additional costs and be required to jump throognr 
additional procedural hoops. The claimant would be 
either to file a separate notice of claim each 
accumulate all claims and wait to file a single notice 
of claim long after accident. In either case, the 
claimant may have ». wait for up to ninety days, 
instead of thirty days, for a response from the 
"insurer." It is unlikely that the legislature anticipated 
or intended that claimants endure such delays when it 
allowed the State to self-insure for PIP benefits. This 
increased burden would clearly be inconsistent with 
the legislative intent found in section 31A-22-309(5) 
that all persons receive their PIP benefits from the 
insurer of the vehicle immediately and with a 
minimum amount of difficulty. See also section 31A-
26-302(1) ("All claims shall be settled as soon as 
possible . . . .") . 
3* The State asserts for the first time on appeal that 
Neel, a State employee, is barred from seeking PIP 
benefits from the State by the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. SeelML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975) 
(employees may not recover additional benefits from 
an employer's no-fault insurance policy). Given the 
fact that only the procedural prerequisites have been 
placed in issue in this appeal, we do not address 
whether the State is otherwise immune from Neel's 
suit. Since that issue has yet to be addressed, it may 
properly be considered on remand. 
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gations to act in good faith and in a com-
mercially reasonable manner. Heller failed 
to provide a trial transcript in the record on 
appeal. Absent a transcript, we must pre-
sume the trial court's findings are based on 
admissible, competent, substantial evi-
dence. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 
(Utah 1986). However, the challenged 
findings pertain only to the loan agreement 
between Rock Wool and Heller. Heller's 
obligations thereunder are not conditions to 
the Ekinses' liability under their uncondi-
tional guaranty. We conclude that find-
ings as to bad faith under the loan agree-
ment are not pertinent to the question of 
liability on the personal guaranty. 
The judgment in favor of the Ekinses is 
reversed, and the award of attorney fees is 
vacated. The case is remanded with in-
structions to the trial court to enter judg-
ment for Heller in the amount of Rock 
Wool's indebtedness plus interest, costs, 
and attorney fees. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Michael H. McCAFFERY, as personal 
representative for and on behalf of 
Christopher M. McCAFFERY, de-
ceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Terry Raymond GROW, as personal rep-
resentative of Rodney V. Grow, de-
ceased, Terry Raymond Grow and Pat 
Grow, individually, and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Compa-
ny, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 880566-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 16, 1990. 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, 
J., granted summary judgment in favor of 
insurer, and father appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that (1) father was 
not entitled to personal injury protection 
benefits and coverage under either insur-
ance code or particular policy with insurer; 
(2)u father was not entitled to proceed 
against insurer under parental liability 
statute; and (3) father could not seek sub-
rogation from insurer. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <3=>467.61(2) 
Father of deceased passenger was not 
entitled to personal injury protection cover-
age under the driver's policy where passen-
ger was not a relative of the driver's family 
who resided with them nor was he killed 
while riding in a vehicle which was insured 
by driver's insurer. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-
308. 
,2. Insurance ^=467.61(2) 
Language of driver's policy, which pro-
vided personal injury protection benefits to 
named insured and related persons who 
resided with insured and other persons in-
jured in insured vehicle, was not ambigu-
ous and did not include passenger within 
scope of coverage where passenger was 
not a relative of the driver's family who 
resided with them nor was he killed while 
riding in the driver's vehicle which was 
insured by his insurer. 
3. Compromise and Settlement <s=>16(l) 
Deceased passenger's father, who set-
tled his claims against minor driver's moth-
er under statute imputing liability to per-
son who signed application of minor for 
driver's permit or license, could not reas-
sert the claims in the guise of a further 
claim against mother's insurer for personal 
injury protection benefits. U.C.A.1953, 41-
2-115(2). 
Deceased passenger's father sued in-
surer of driver, who operated motor vehicle 
without owner's consent, for personal inju-
ry protection benefits. The Third District 
absolute guarantor may consent to the impair-
ment of collateral, and such waiver may be 
given in advance in the guaranty agre&l£ftt44 Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Uta^ \9*p\ 
4. Insurance <s=>2, 604(1) 
Father of deceased automobile passen-
ger was not an "insurer," notwithstanding 
that one may legally provide security in lieu 
provided it is explicit and unequivocal). See 
also Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Sec. 
902 *h 787 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
of automobile insurance, and thus, statute, 
requiring personal injury protection (PIP) 
insurer of person liable for injuries to reim-
burse another insurer who had paid PIP 
benefits, did not require PIP insurer of neg-
ligent driver to reimburse father for sums 
he expended due to the passenger's death. 
U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(6). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
James R. Brown and Harold L. Reiser, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Darwin C. Hansen and John C. Hansen, 
Bountiful, for defendants and respondents. 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant Michael H. McCaffery appeals 
from a summary judgment order dismiss-
ing his claim against respondent insurance 
company for personal injury protection 
benefits. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The facts are essentially undisputed in 
this case. On August 27, 1986, a group of 
high school students attended a "last sum-
mer fling" drinking party in East Canyon. 
Sometime during the party, Christopher 
McCaffery, Rodney Grow, and Michael 
Quintana went joyriding up and down East 
Canyon in an automobile owned by Michael 
Morris, without his knowledge or permis-
sion. While Rodney Grow was driving the 
vehicle, he lost control and crashed into a 
tree. The three young men were killed. 
The automobile was not insured. More-
over, it appears that neither Christopher 
McCaffery, nor his parents with whom he 
resided, had automobile insurance. Rod-
ney Grow and his mother, who had signed 
Rodney's driver's license application, were 
insureds of respondent State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company ("State 
Farm") at the time of the accident. 
Michael McCaffery ("McCaffery") 
brought suit against several defendantp^ 
behalf of his late son Christopher's estate. 
He claimed that Rodney Grow was liable, 
and so sued his father and personal repre-
sentative, Terry Grow. He claimed Pat 
Grow, Rodney's mother, was jointly and 
severally liable because she signed Rod-
ney's driver's license application and Rod-
pey Grow was still a minor at the time of 
his death. He claimed that State Farm 
was responsible as the insurer of Rodney 
Grow. 
McCaffery settled all claims against all 
defendants except for his claim for person-
al injury protection ("PIP") benefits 
against State Farm. State Farm moved 
for summary judgment on this claim. It 
argued that neither its insurance policy nor 
the law requires the payment of PIP bene-
fits to a passenger injured in an automobile 
which is not covered by the policy, even 
though driven by an insured, where the 
insured does not have the permission of the 
owner. The district court agreed and 
granted State Farm summary judgment. 
On appeal, McCaffery raises several ar-
guments. Although he did not himself see 
fit to secure the insurance required by the 
same law, he claims that the State Farm 
policy impermissibly denies PIP benefits in 
contravention of Utah's insurance code and 
public policy. He asserts that the lan-
guage in the insurance policy is ambiguous 
and should be construed against State 
Farm to allow recovery of PIP benefits. 
He argues that State Farm should pay the 
PIP benefits because it also insured Pat 
Grow, who was liable as the signor of 
Rodney's motor vehicle license application. 
Finally, McCaffery argues that he is enti-
tled to subrogation from State Farm for 
the expenses he incurred as a result of 
Grow's negligence. 
DENIAL OF PIP BENEFITS 
[1] The motor vehicle insurance sec-
tions of Utah's insurance code require ev-
ery insurer to include liability coverage, 
uninsured motorist coverage, and PIP cov-
erage in their motor vehicle insurance poli-
cies. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 
(1989). The code extends PIP coverage to 
individuals described in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-308 (1986) and prevents the in-
surer from excluding PIP benefits to those 
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persons except in seven narrowly defined 
situations. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-309 (1989).1 
McCaffery focuses his argument on the 
exclusionary provision set forth in section 
309, relying on State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1987), and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). These cases held 
that an insurance company could not create 
an exclusion which would prevent a resi-
dent family member of the insured from 
recovering PIP benefits under the in-
sured's policy. 
In response to McCaffery's position, 
State Farm argues the issue is not one of 
exclusion from coverage. Rather, State 
Farm argues that, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Mastbaum and Call, Christopher McCaf-
fery was never included in the class of 
insureds. See Osuala v. Aetna Life & 
Cos., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). See 
also Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Padron9 
310 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975). 
We agree. 
The insurance code provides that 
"[e]very policy of insurance or combination 
of policies, purchased to satisfy the own-
er's or operator's security requirement . . . 
shall also include personal injury protection 
under sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-
22-309." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2) 
(1989). Section 306 then states that "[per-
sonal injury protection under Subsection 
31A-22-302(2) provides coverages and ben-
efits . . . to persons described under 
§ 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limita-
tions, exclusions, and conditions set forth in 
1. When this controversy arose the code only 
contained four narrowly defined situations in 
which the insurer could exclude PIP benefits. 
The code provided: 
Any insurer issuing personal injury protec-
tion coverage under this part may only ex-
clude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured 
while occupying another motor vehicle owned 
by the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person 
while operating the insured motor vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of 
the insured motor vehicle; or 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's 
conduct contributed to his injury: 
O* McCA**fcKX v. GROW Utan 9 0 3 
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§ 31A-22-309." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-306 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Thus, we must first look to section 308 to 
determine who is within the scope of the 
PIP coverage and benefits provided for by-
law. 
Section 308 provides: 
The following may receive benefits un-
der personal injury protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured and persons 
related to the insured by blood, mar-
riage, adoption, or guardianship who 
are residents of the insured's house-
hold, including those who usually 
make their home in the same house-
hold but temporarily live elsewhere, 
when injured in an accident in Utah 
involving any motor vehicle; and 
(2) any other natural person whose 
injuries arise out of an automobile acci-
dent occurring in Utah while the per-
son occupies a motor vehicle described 
in the policy with the express or im-
plied consent of the named insured or 
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an 
accident involving the described motor 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1986) (em-
phasis added). As concerns the subject 
State Farm policy, McCaffery does not, nor 
could he, claim that Christopher falls with-
in the ambit of section 308. Christopher 
was not a relative of the Grows who resid-
ed with them nor was he killed while riding 
in the Grow vehicle insured by State Farm. 
Thus, the law did not require State Farm to 
extend PIP benefits to someone in Christo-
pher's position.2 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to him-
self; or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(2)(a) (1986). 
2. McCaffery argues that public policy requires 
the extension of PIP benefits and coverage to all 
innocent victims of automobile accidents. It is 
true that the No-Fault Act was adopted in order 
to protect the rights of innocent accident vic-
tims. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1985). However, "[a]n important as-
pect of the Act is the requirement that the PIP 
protections for an injured motorist are to be 
paid by his own insurer." Osuala v. Aetna Life 
& Cos., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). It is 
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Nor does State Farm's policy purport to 
extend PIP benefits to Christopher. The 
policy stated, in the No-Fault section, that 
State Farm would "pay in accordance with 
the No-Fault Act for bodily injury to 
insured caused by accident resulting from 
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle 
as a motor vehicle." On the page immedi-
ately following this language, the policy 
defined insured to mean, with our empha-
sis, 
1. you, your spouse or any relative: 
... and 
2. any other person : 
a. while occupying your car or a 
newly acquired car with the permis-
sion of: 
(1) you, your spouse, any relative; 
or 
(2) the person, driving such car with 
your permission; or 
b. when struck as a pedestrian by 
your car or a newly acquired car. 
The language in these provisions is no 
more expansive than that in section 308. 
Thus, neither the law nor the particular 
policy in question purport to extend PIP 
benefits to persons in Christopher McCaf-
fery's position. We hold that McCaffery is 
not entitled to PIP coverage under the 
State Farm policy covering Rodney Grow. 
AMBIGUITY OF POLICY 
[2] McCaffery asserts that the lan-
guage of the insurance policy is ambiguous 
and should be construed to allow McCaf-
fery to recover PIP benefits. This argu-
ment is without merit. 
To illustrate his argument, McCaffery 
cites State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Eastman, 158 Cal.App.3d 562, 204 Cal. 
Rptr. 827 (1984). In Eastman, the Califor-
nia court determined that language in the 
liability portion of a policy was ambiguous 
and could reasonably be read to extend 
coverage to appellant. The court conclud-
ed that, when ambiguous, language should 
be read "in its most inclusive sense, for the 
pertinent to note that the Legislature contem-
plated protection for Christopher McCaffery in 
the instant situation through the insurance poli-
Page 
benefit of the insured/' 204 Cal.Rptr. at 
830 (quoting Continental Cos. Co. v. Phoe-
nix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 296 P.2d 
801, 810 (1956)). 
Utah courts embrace the rule of law stat-
ed in Eastman. See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. 
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 861 
(Utah 1988) ("any ambiguity must be re-
solved in favor of the insured and in favor 
of coverage"). However, McCaffery has 
not shown any ambiguity within the PIP 
section of the policy. Rather, McCaffery 
refers us to language in the liability por-
tion of the policy which was similar to 
language in the policy in Eastman. He 
then implies that because language might 
have been ambiguous in the liability section 
of the policy we should find the entire 
policy to be ambiguous and allow recovery 
under the PIP section. This does not fol-
low. McCaffery has settled any claims he 
had under the liability section of the policy. 
The only issue properly before us in this 
appeal is the entitlement to PIP benefits 
under the PIP section of the policy. 
McCaffery has not demonstrated any rele-
vant ambiguity in that portion of the policy. 
On the contrary, the policy—clearly and 
unambiguously—does not include Christo-
pher McCaffery within the scope of cover-
age for PIP benefits. 
PAT GROWS LIABILITY AS SIGNOR 
OF RODNEY GROWS LICENSE 
APPLICATION 
[3] McCaffery argues that Pat Grow is 
jointly and severally liable for the damage 
caused by her minor child, Rodney, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2) (1988), 
which provides: 
Any negligence or willful misconduct 
of a minor younger than 18 years of age 
when operating a motor vehicle upon a 
highway is imputed to the person who 
has signed the application of the minor 
for a permit or license. This person is 
jointly and severally liable with the mi-
nor for any damages caused by the negli-
gence or willful misconduct 
He further argues that State Farm, as Pat 
Grow's insurer, is ultimately liable for 
cy the McCafferys should have acquired on their 
own automobile. See id. 
00124 
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these costs and should pay the PIP bene-
fits. 
In response to this assertion, State Farm 
raises several arguments. However, we 
need only address one argument which is 
dispositive of the issue. In order to reach 
State Farm on this theory, McCaffery must 
first prove the liability of Pat Grow under 
§ 41-2-115(2). Prior to summary judg-
ment, the various parties to the action 
reached a stipulation to dismiss McCaf-
fery's complaint against all of the defen-
dants except State Farm and to dismiss all 
claims against State Farm except for the 
claim concerning PIP benefits. Thereafter, 
the court dismissed the various claims with 
prejudice. McCaffery has settled his 
claims against Pat Grow and cannot now 
resurrect them in the guise of a further 
claim against State Farm—especially 
where the only claim expressly reserved as 
against State Farm is that concerning PIP 
STATE FARM'S DUTY TO 
INDEMNIFY MICHAEL 
McCAFFERY 
[4] Finally, McCaffery apparently ar-
gues that State Farm is ultimately liable at 
least for certain sums he actually expended 
by reason of Christopher's death. He re-
lies on section 309(6) of the insurance code, 
which at the time of the accident was 
phrased as follows: 
Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage shall provide: 
(a) that where the insured under the 
policy is or would be held legally liable 
for the personal injuries sustained by 
any person to whom benefits required 
under personal injury protection have 
been paid by another insurer, includ-
ing the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah, the insurer of the person who 
would be held legally liable shall reim-
burse the other insurer for the pay-
ment, but not in excess of the amount 
of damages recoverable; and 
3. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301 to -412 
(1988). However, McCaffery does not contend 
he actually complied with these provisions. 
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(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amounts shall 
be decided by mandatory, binding arbi-
tration between the insurers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1986) 
(emphasis added). McCaffery cannot pre-
vail under this statutory provision. 
In order to invoke the provisions of sec-
tion 309(6), the individual who initially pays 
the amounts for which PIP benefits are 
also available must be "another insurer." 
Although McCaffery correctly observed at 
oral argument that the law allows a person 
to provide his or her own security in place 
of automobile insurance,3 to do so does not 
make one "an insurer" within the meaning 
of the statute. According to Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-l-301(48)(a) (1989), " '[insurer' 
means any person doing an insurance busi-
ness as a principal." McCaffery does not 
claim, and the facts do not suggest, that he 
was a "principal" "doing an insurance busi-
ness" when he paid Christopher's medical 
bills and the like. Section 31A-22-309(6) 
simply does not contemplate arbitration be-
tween an uninsured victim's father and an-
other's insurance company.4 
CONCLUSION 
McCaffery is not entitled to PIP benefits 
and coverage under either the Utah insur-
ance code or the particular policy with 
State Farm. Moreover, he is not entitled to 
proceed against State Farm under 
§ 41-2-115(2) because he stipulated to the 
release of any claim he might have had 
against Pat Grow. Finally, he may not 
seek subrogation from State Farm under 
§ 31A-22-309(6) because he is not "an in-
surer" within the meaning of the statute, 
tn all rejects, we affirm. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
4. We note that even if we were to Find that 
§ 31A-22-309(6) was available to McCaffery, 
this court would not be the correct forum in 
which to pursue his claim. The statute specifies 
arbitration as the proper recourse. 
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D. ATTY. OCHOA, BARBARA H 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO VACE MINUE ENTRY DATED JUNE 16,1993, MOTION 
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL 
ARGUMENT ARE SUMMARILY DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS; 
1) THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY ENCOMPASED THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE FOREGOING MOTIONS. 
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PREPARATION OF JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY AND FOUND 
NEIL TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE FFROM THE PRESENT CASE. 
3) THE COURT SUBMITS SECOND REQUEST TO THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS MINUTE ENTRY 
AND THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
a body politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No, 920905486PD 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came before the Court on April 19, 1993 on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
presiding• Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Thomas A. Duffin, 
and Defendant was represented by counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa, 
Assistant Attorney General. In addition, the Court has considered 
the following motions which were subsequently submitted by 
Plaintiff: Motion to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 1993; 
Motion to File Amended Complaint; and Motion for Additional Oral 
Argument. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard 
the argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premd^ 
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now orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of 
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff failed to comply 
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of 
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff's complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under U.C.A. 
§ 31A-22-309(5). 
3. Plaintiff's Motions to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 
1993, to File an Amended Complaint and for Additional Oral Argument 
are denied for the reasons that the June 16, 1993 minute entry 
encompassed the issues raised in Plaintiff's subsequent motions and 
the Court had reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to issuing the 
Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and found it to be distinguishable 
from the present case. 
DATED this A 3 day of ^ T , 1993 
10NE E. MEDLEY 
Thircfl/District Court Ijtf&g 
Approved as to form: 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
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